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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL \ 
SAVINGS AND LOAN | 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 1 
vs > Case No. 8720 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, \ 
a corporation, I 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
ANSWER OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAV-
INGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE CERTAIN FINDINGS 
OF FACT WHICH ARE COMPLETE ANSWERS TO 
THE CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT CONTAINED 
IN POINT I OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-
HEARING. 
Respondent invites the Court's attention to the 
following Findings of Fact: 
"9. The agreement of July 19, 1950 (PR 2) 
was subsequently modified by written agreement 
dated September 20, 1950 (PR 5) which recited 
l 
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that there had been delay in recording the mortgages 
and thereby a delay was incurred in securing avail-
ability of funds and, therefore, the time for comple-
tion of the dwelling houses was extended. Hartford 
agreed to this modification." (Ex PR 5 and Ex PR 
4 support this Finding.) 
"10. On August 10, 1950 Syndicate, Pruden-
tial, Cassady and Associated Accountants entered 
into an agreement (PR 8) which in substance pro-
vided that all funds made available by Prudential 
from proceeds of the veterans' mortgages should 
be disbursed by and through Associated Account-
ants. Prudential was to transmit available funds to 
Associated Accountants for disbursement. The dis-
bursements were to be made in accordance with 
tables attached to the agreement based upon the 
amount of the funds paid by Prudential to Associ-
ated Accountants and the progress of the work. 
* * * * " . (Italics supplied) (Ex PR 8 supports this 
Finding) 
"13. Actual construction work on the project 
was commenced prior to June 22, 1950 by way of 
excavating basements and footings for the dwelling 
houses. This work was performed before any mort-
gage in favor of Prudential was recorded. As a con-
sequence, all of the parties to the transaction were 
aware of the fact that liens of unpaid material men 
and laborers would be senior to the liens of the mort-
2 
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gages. Prudential, therefore, demanded that not only 
the bond (PR 1) described in Finding 12 designat-
ing Prudential as an obligee, be executed but also 
that each mortgage loan be insured by an ATA 
title policy so as to afford Prudential double protec-
tion against senior material and labor liens. Secur-
ity Title Company, a Utah corporation doing busi-
ness in Salt Lake City was the resident agent of 
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company which 
agreed to write these policies. It agreed to issue the 
ATA policies provided, however, Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Company was also made an Obligee under 
the $763,000.00 bond. (PR 1)" (This finding is 
supported by substantial evidence found at R. 35, 
R. 59, R. 60, R. 170, R. 171, R. 172, R. 232, R. 318, 
R. 319, R. 324, R. 332) 
"14. Sales of the homes in Morningside 
Heights were negotiated by a firm of real estate 
agents in Salt Lake, acting for and employed by 
Syndicate. At the times the bond (PR 1) and the 
contracts above described (PR 2, PR 7 and PR 8) 
were executed, only part of the dwelling houses 
were sold. The sale of these houses was an opera-
tion which continued into December of 1950. This 
fact, plus necessary time consumed in processing 
the mortgage applications by the Veterans Admin-
istration through its Salt Lake office and the fur-
ther fact that the completion of the transactions and 
3 
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and the securing of the execution of the mortgages 
by the veterans and their wives required additional 
time, delayed the recordation of the mortgages in 
the office of the Recorder of Salt Lake County. Pru-
dential had no duty or authority to disburse any 
funds for or on behalf of a veteran-borrower unless 
and until his mortgage was duly recorded. As soon 
as the mortgage processing was completed and a 
mortgage was recorded, Prudential promptly trans-
mitted to Associated Accountants then available 
funds. There was no unreasonable delay or lack of 
diligence on Prudential's part at any time in effect-
ing disbursement of the mortgage funds." (This 
Finding is supported by substantial evidence found 
at R. 362, R. 363, R. 364, R. 366 and by Ex PR 7 
and Ex PR 8). 
"16. Cassady failed to complete said dwelling 
houses within the time required by his said con-
tract with Syndicate dated July 19, 1950 (PR 2) as 
modified by said Supplemental Agreement dated 
September 20, 1950 (PR 5). By the month of Feb-
ruary 1951 none of the dwelling houses had been 
completed so as to meet the requirements of the 
Veterans Administration and work on the project 
had all but ceased. On February 16,1951, Syndicate, 
Prudential, Cassady and Associated Accountants 
executed a Supplemental Agreement (PR 6) where-
by they agreed to the amendment in specified par-
4 
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ticulars of the Contract of June 16, 1950 between 
Prudential and Syndicate (PR 7 ) ; the contract of 
July 19, 1950 (PR 2) between Syndicate and Cas-
sady as amended by Agreement of September 20, 
1950 (PR 5) and the contract of August 10, 1950 
between Prudential, Syndicate, Cassady and Asso-
ciated Accountants (PR 8) as amended by Agree-
ment of August 22, 1950 (PR 3). By the Supple-
mental Agreement dated February 16, 1951 (PR 
6) the parties agreed: 
a. That the dwelling houses should be com-
pleted by June 1, 1951 and the failure to complete 
said houses by said date or default by Syndicate to 
perform all things necessary to secure final approv-
al of Veterans Administration would give Pruden-
tial at its election the right to complete the project 
(amending Par 7 of Art II of Contract of June 16, 
1950 (PR 7). 
b. That all unexpended mortgage proceeds 
held by Prudential might be disbursed by Pruden-
tial at such time or times and in such manner and 
in such amounts as in the sole judgment and dis-
cretion of Prudential was necessary and proper to 
secure the expeditious completion of said dwelling 
houses and payment of all material men or laborers 
(Amending Par 4 of Art I of Contract of June 16, 
1950 (PR 7). 
c. Cassady would construct 29 houses instead 
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of 26 houses based on Floor Plan I for the price of 
$7800.00 each; 35 houses instead of 36 houses based 
on Floor Plan 3 for $7340.00 each and 36 houses 
instead of 30 houses based on Floor Plan 4 for 
$7920.00 (Amending Par 22 of Contract of July 
19,1950 (PR 2 ) ; 
d. All payments under the Contract of July 
19, 1950 (PR 2) would be paid by Prudential to 
subcontractors through a bonded disbursing agency, 
but should be at such time or times, and in such 
manner and in such amounts as Prudential deemed 
necessary and proper to secure the payment of all 
subcontractors, material men and laborers (Amend-
ing Par 23, Art III of Contract of July 19, 1950 
(PR 2) . 
e. By this supplemental agreement of Feb-
ruary 16,1951 (PR 6) Cassady irrevocably admitted 
that it had secured from Syndicate and Associated 
Accountants an accounting of all funds paid by 
Prudential to Associated Accountants and confirm-
ed and approved all of the disbursements made by 
Associated Accountants to the date of the agreement. 
f. By this Supplemental Agreement of Feb-
ruary 16, 1951 (PR 6), Syndicate, Cassady and 
Associated Accountants admitted they had secured 
from Prudential an accounting of the proceeds of all 
mortgage loans and down payments and disburse-
ments thereof by Prudential to date of agreement; 
6 
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confirmed and approved all disbursements made by 
Prudential to date of agreement and admitted, 
agreed and declared that Prudential had performed 
all of its obligations under the contract of June 16, 
1950 (PR 7) the contract of August 10, 1950 (PR 
8) and Supplemental Agreement of August 22,1950 
(PR 3) from respective dates thereof to February 
16, 1951." (This Finding is supported by Ex PR 6.) 
"17. The Supplemental Agreement dated Feb-
ruary 16, 1951 (PR 6) became effective upon ap-
proval by Hartford and Pacific Coast Title Insur-
ance Company. This Agreement was approved in 
full on February 20, 1951 by said Title Insurance 
Company and was presented to Hartford on the same 
date, and thereby it gained full knowledge thereof. 
By endorsement it consented to the amendment of 
Pars. 22 and 23, Art III of the Contract of July 
19, 1950, and Par. 7, Art II of the Contract of 
August 22, 1950." (This finding is supported by 
Ex PR 6) 
"29. Any delay in disbursing the mortgage 
proceeds by Prudential at the commencement of 
work in the summer of 1950 on the Morningside 
Heights project was caused by Cassady prematurely 
commencing work on the project before the execu-
tion, delivery and recording of the mortgages exec-
uted by the veteran-borrowers. Cassady knew that 
Prudential would not disburse the mortgage pro-
7 
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ceeds until mortgages were properly executed and 
recorded. The time lag thereby occasioned was the 
direct and immediate result of Cassady's own action 
in commencing construction work before mortgage 
funds were available under the terms of said sev-
eral contracts. Cassady assumed this risk of his own 
volition and choice" (This Finding is supported by 
substantial evidence found at R. 38, R. 39, R. 47, 
R. 232, R. 233, R. 249, R. 318, R. 319, R. 320, R. 321, 
R. 322, R. 324, R. 326, R. 327, R. 332, R. 333.) 
"31. After the effective date of said Supple-
mental Agreement of February 16, 1951 (PR 6) 
Prudential in honesty and in good faith exercised 
its discretion in disbursing mortgage proceeds in 
payment of the obligations due to sub-contractors 
and in payment of laborers and material employed 
and used in the construction of dwelling houses on 
said project. Prudential did not withhold or delay 
the payment of any mortgage proceeds that it was 
rightfully authorized to disburse." (This Finding 
is supported by substantial evidence found at R. 
104, R. 105, R. 374). 
"39. Felt Syndicate, Inc. did not breach its 
contractual obligations to Cassady or to Hartford in 
any substantial manner and any differences between 
them were resolved by extensions of time granted 
to Cassady Company, Inc. and by the Supplemental 
Agreement between the parties entered February 
8 
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16, 1951." (This Finding is supported by substan-
tial evidence found in Ex PR 4, Ex PR 5, Ex PR 6, 
R. 348). 
Appellant in its Petition for Rehearing has 
quoted from the court's opinion in this case six 
separate statements which have been removed from 
the context of the opinion. (Sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6 of Appellant's Point I). These quotations are 
asserted to be proof that the Court's decision "is 
based on a misapprehension of certain fundamental 
facts." The principal vein of thought which runs 
through this contention is that Felt breached its 
contract with Cassady "because Felt failed to pay 
Cassady the course of construction payments pro-
vided in the primary construction contract, and also 
in the disbursal agreement." 
By way of further defense Appellant argues 
that Appellant is bound by the Supplemental Agree-
ment of February 16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) only to a 
limited degree (Subparagraphs 5 and 6, Point I), 
and hence this Agreement has no bearing upon the 
ultimate liability of Appellant. 
Respondent believes it should again emphasize 
four propositions in this case, which cannot be de-
nied, by quoting from page 59 of its original brief: 
"1 . Cassady failed, neglected and re-
fused to procure the 100 dwelling houses in 
Morningside Heights to be constructed in ac-
9 
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cordance with the plans and specifications 
approved by Veterans Administration. (Hart-
ford admits this fact). 
"2. Cassady failed, neglected and re-
fused to secure from Veterans Administration 
its approval of the construction of such dwel-
ling houses. (Hartford admits this fact). 
"3. Because the said dwelling houses 
were not constructed in accordance with the 
plans and specifications approved by the Vet-
erans Administration, it refused to guarantee 
the mortgages owned and held by Prudential. 
(Hartford admits this fact). 
"4. As a result of the refusal of Veter-
ans' Administration to guarantee said mort-
gages, Prudential suffered damages. (Hart-
ford on this appeal has neither questioned the 
amount of damages awarded Prudential nor 
the method of the trial Court in determining 
these damages)." 
Respondent also quotes from its original brief, 
(page 60) its comments on the foregoing four pro-
positions : 
"It is manifest, therefore, that Cassady 
was guilty of violation of the contract dated 
July 19, 1950 between Felt and Cassady (Ex. 
PR 2) performance of which by Cassady was 
guaranteed by Hartford. Since Prudential was 
a third party beneficiary under said contract 
it had a direct action thereon against Cassady 
for its violation thereof and an action against 
Hartford as surety on Cassady's bond. The 
bond itself specifically designated Pruden-
tial as an obligee thereof and recognized its 
clear right to claim and sue thereon." 
10 
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"Prudential, therefore, respectfully but 
emphatically asserts to the Court that it has 
affirmatively made its case against Hartford 
and the evidence in the action fully supports 
that conclusion beyond per adventure." 
In order to meet Respondent's case, Appellant 
must assume a defensive position and it does this 
by throwing up the exceedingly thin line of defense 
that "Felt failed to pay Cassady the course of con-
struction payments." Appellant has chosen to ignore 
the Findings of Fact above set forth. At no place 
in its Petition does it question a Finding of Fact 
made by the trial Court. Its main attack is upon 
certain phraseology of the Court's opinion. The 
reason for this strategy is obvious — each Finding 
above quoted is supported by competent, substan-
tial evidence, and to quote from the Court's opinion: 
"Inasmuch as the trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to 
have us review the evidence and every reason-
able inference fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to them." (Buehner 
Block Co., v. Glezos, 6 Utah (2d) 226; 310 
Pac (2d) 517; Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah (2d) 
127;262Pac (2d) 760.) 
1. Cassady cannot claim a violation by Felt 
of the "course of construction" payments formula. 
Cassady before entering upon the construction 
work knew (a) that the only source of funds from 
11 
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which it was to obtain payment was the proceeds 
of the veterans' mortgages; (b) that such funds 
would not be available until the veterans' application 
was processed by Veterans' Administration; (c) 
that Prudential must approve the loan; (d) that 
the veteran and his wife must execute all required 
mortgage papers; and (e) that the mortgage must 
be recorded on the public records. Notwithstanding 
such knowledge, Cassady elected to commence work. 
It assumed the risk and hazard of such process. 
Findings 14 and 29 are the only Findings which 
could have been made by the Trial Court on the evi-
dence in this case. Cassady's difficulties stemmed 
not from the delay in the "course of construction" 
payments, but from its own action in commencing 
construction work before funds were available un-
der the contracts. The Construction Agreement of 
July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR 2) and the disbursing agree-
ment of August 10, 1950 (Ex. PR 8) to which Cas-
sady was a party, specifically gave Cassady notice 
as to the source of funds and when and how they 
were to be paid it. The testimony of C. J. Cassady 
is replete with admissions of Cassady's complete 
knowledge of this situation. Cassady cannot enter 
upon such course of conduct, with full knowledge 
of the hazards and perils of such "calculated risk" 
(See Scott's testimony at R. 325, 326, 333) and then 
when the risk turned against it, attempt to rely upon 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the strict terms of the contract. By its own conduct 
rendered impossible performance by Felt of the 
"course of construction" formula of the agreement. 
Upon this state of facts the Trial Court properly 
found that there had been no substantial breach of 
contract by Syndicate. (Finding 39). 
2. Cassady by the Agreement of February 
16,1951 (Ex. PR 6) acknowledged full performance 
by Prudential of the Agreement of June 16, 1950, 
(Ex. PR 7), the Agreement of August 10,1950 (Ex 
PR 8) and of the Agreement of August 22, 1950 
(Ex. PR S), and also admitted it had secured from 
Felt and Associated Accountants an accounting 
of all funds paid by Prudential to Accountants. 
Reference to the Agreement of February 16, 
1951 (Ex. PR 6) and to Findings 16 and 17 proves 
that Cassady possessed complete knowledge of the 
source of the funds which had been paid by Pru-
dential to Associated Accountants, and finally re-
ceived by it; approved the accounting of same and 
exculpated Prudential from any charge of breach 
of the contracts to which Prudential was a party 
up to February 16, 1951. By this Agreement of Feb-
ruary 16, 1951 it is manifest that the parties in-
tended to rehabilitate Cassady and place it in a posi-
tion to go forward with this construction work and 
complete its contract with Felt. The agreement had 
no other purpose. An extension of time was granted 
13 
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Cassady for performance; an adjustment was made 
in the types of homes to be built by it, and payment 
therefor, and Prudential was freed from limitations 
on disbursement of the veteran-mortgagors' funds 
by vesting in Prudential a discretion in making dis-
bursement of the funds. (The veteran-mortgagors 
gave their consent to this arrangement (R. 39, R. 
105) These provisions were to aid Cassady in the 
performance of its agreement. Cassady knew that 
the funds it had been paid by Associated Account-
ants were proceeds of veterans' mortgages and by 
agreeing that it had received from Felt and Asso-
ciated Accountants an accounting of these funds, 
it also agreed it has received all "available funds" 
to date of the agreement. Cassady therefore fore-
closed its right to question the amount of payments 
it had received. It knew that the only funds to which 
it was entitled were the "available" funds arising 
from veterans' loans and when it agreed that Felt 
and Associated Accountants had made accounting 
to it for these funds "and confirmed and approved 
all of the disbursements made by Associated Ac-
countants to the date of the agreement", it in fact 
agreed that it had received all payments due it to 
February 16,1951. This amounted to broad approval 
and exculpation by Cassady of all that occurred 
before. By its own acts in prematurely entering upon 
the construction work, it had made impossible com-
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pliance with the "course of construction" formula 
by Felt, and by the Agreement of February 16,1951, 
Cassady admitted that notwithstanding a variance 
in the times of payment (caused by its own volun-
tary acts) it had received all that was due it from 
Felt to February 16,1951. 
3. Hartford is bound by the terms of the 
Agreement of February 16, 1951. (Ex. PR 6) 
An important provision (called hereinafter 
"open door" provision) of the bond (Ex. PR 1) which 
is the subject of this action reads as follows: 
"6. The prior written approval of Su-
rety shall be required with regard to any 
changes or alterations in said contract where 
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or 
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all 
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent 
of the original contract price; but, except as 
to the foregoing, any alterations which may 
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the 
work to be done under it, or the giving by 
the obligees of any extension of time for the 
performance of the contract, or tmy other 
forebearance on the part of either the obligees 
or principal to the other, shall not in any way 
release Surety or Principal of the obligations 
of this instrument, notice of Surety of any 
such alterations, extension, or forebearance 
being hereby waived." (Italics supplied) 
(Paragraph 6 of the Bond) 
There is no question in this case that the cost 
of any changes or alterations were less than 10% 
15 
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of the contract price. (Finding 30; R. 262) Cassady 
only claimed that there was due it between forty-
four and fifty thousand dollars by way of dawmges 
and "extras/' and the trial court denied that re-
covery. (R. 262) C. J. Cassady in his testimony 
(R. 240-245) itemized the amount of Cassady's 
claim for "extras" and damages and totaled the same 
in the amount of $51,850.70 — an amount well 
under 10% of the original contract price of $763,-
000.00 (Ex. PR 2) . Therefore, the above quoted 
provision of the bond became fully operative and by 
it Cassady and Felt were at liberty to make any 
changes or alterations in the contract which they 
elected to make without consent of or notice to Hart-
ford. The Court in its opinion in the case wrote: 
"The trial court found that Hartford 
did become a party to the supplemental con-
tract by giving its approval to the modifica-
tions of the portion of the original contract 
which it desired to have modified without 
expressly limiting its agreement to the other 
parts of the supplemental agreement." 
The trial court found that the Supplemental 
Agreement of February 16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) was 
presented to Hartford and it gained full knowledge 
thereof and that by endorsement it consented to 
amendment of certain provisions of the contract of 
July 19, 1950 and of August 22, 1950 (Finding 
17). The trial court conduded as a matter of law 
that: 
16 
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"8. Cassady irrevocably compromised 
and settled all claims for breach of contract 
or otherwise against Syndicate and Pruden-
tial or either of them arising prior to Febru-
ary 16, 1951 by the Supplemental Agreement 
of February 16, 1951 and is estopped and 
foreclosed from asserting same and Hartford 
was informed and had complete knowledge 
of Cassady's actions in this respect." 
The Court in making the statement quoted 
above from it opinion (Page 16 of this brief) 
was entirely correct. Paragraph 6 of the bond 
set forth in full above, authorized Cassady to 
act for Hartford in Negotiating and execut-
ing the Supplemental Agreement of February 
16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) inasmuch as there was 
no increase in cost exceeding 10% of the "original 
contract price." When the Supplemental Agreement 
was presented to Hartford, it gave its affirmative 
consent to certain provisions of the contract, but 
it did not disavow the other provisions of the Supple-
mental Agreement. They became fully operative 
against Hartford because the bond itself (Par. 6, 
supra) specifically declared that "any alteration 
which may be made in the terms of the contract, or 
the work to be done under it * * * shall not in any 
way release Surety or Principal of the obligations 
of this instrument **** . " 
It appears to be clear beyond argument that (a) 
Cassady by the Supplemental Agreement of Feb-
ruary 16, 1951 (Ex. PR 6) waived all claims for 
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breach of contract by Felt prior to that date 
(if any existed) and (b) by virtue of paragraph 
6 of the bond Hartford is bound by such action on 
the part of Cassady. Hartford, when the Supple-
mental Agreement was presented to it, had the op-
portunity of refusing to be a party to such arrange-
ment; it did not The court, therefore, was wholly 
justified in its statement above quoted. 
4. Rartford must assume full responsibility 
for Cassady's premature commencement of work on 
the project and in assuming a "calculated risk" that 
funds would be disbursed according to the "course 
of construction" provisions of the contract 
The witness, Scott, gave some illuminating evi-
dence, which stands uncontradicted, concerning Cas-
sady's premature commencement of work on the 
Morningside Heights project: 
"Q. Did you give the instructions to 
commence work on construction early in June? 
What were the circumstances of the construc-
tion? (R. 323) 
A. Of the start of construction? (R. 
324) 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, it was a rather confused cir-
cumstances at the time. Mr. Cassady was hav-
ing quite a bit of trouble making his bond, 
and he had sent to Los Angeles for help on 
that situation, and things in general looked 
like they had reached a stand still, so Mr. Ross 
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was in a hurry. He had gone to the expense 
of buying steel forms for this project. 
Q. Now, what was Ross' function? 
A. He was the fellow that put in the 
cement foundations, done the excavating and 
back filling. He had purchased these three 
sets of steel forms at about — cost of about 
ten or twelve thousand dollars, and he was 
in a hurry, so it was agreed to start ten or 
twelve houses. 
Q. When you say "it was agreed", who 
agreed? 
A. Everybody concerned; Mr. Ross, 
Mr. Snyder, Mr. Cassady. The conference was 
held in George Snyder's office. 
Q. And that was when, late in May 
1950? 
A. Yes, that was in May. 
Q. And that was done consciously with 
a realization that financing had not been com-
pleted? 
Mr. Christensen: I object to that as lead-
ing and suggestive, calling for a conclusion. 
The Court: It seems to be leading. 
Q. Well, you knew at that time that no 
mortgages had been executed and delivered. 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Christensen: Same objection. 
Q. You knew that. 
The Court: The answer may stand (R. 
324) 
* * * * 
Q. What was said at that conference, 
Mr. Scott? (R. 325) 
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Mr. Christensen: Now wait a minute, 
I would like to know who was present at that 
conference. 
A. All right, C. P. Cassady, C. J. Cas-
sady, George Snyder, Mr. Ross and myself. 
Mr. Christensen: Anyone representing 
the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany so far as you know? 
A. No. (R. 325) 
Mr. Christensen: I will object to it as 
hearsay. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
I will hear. While you may not be bound indi-
vidually for anything, still you may be liable 
under your contract if your insured is bound. 
Mr. Riter: I think the question is good. 
The Court: I will let him answer. 
Q. All right, now, have you any recol-
lection — and if you haven't any recollection, 
simply say so — as to what you said to the 
Cassadys or what Mr. George Snyder said 
to the Cassadys (R. 325), or Mr. Ross said to 
the Cassadys with respect to commencing work 
on the project at the meeting? (R. 326) 
A. Well, it would be rather hard for 
me to recall exactly what was said there. 
Q. Can you give the substance of it? 
A. Well, the substance of the meeting 
was that we went to work. 
Q. Was anything discussed about the 
fact that no mortgages were recorded? 
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A. Yes, there was some discussion on 
that, and that was prompted by a situation 
that had arisen in the immediate past, and 
that was the subject of Mr. Cassady's finan-
cial position. I'm not — at the time this bond 
was applied for, a financial statement was 
submitted, and the amount of cash shown on 
that statement was very inadequate for the 
undertaking of a project this size. Therefore, 
Mr. Cassady obtained help on this situation. 
Q. That help was from Mr. Peter Shel-
by? 
A. Yes, and that financial situation 
was discussed and the conclusion was that 
between Mr. Shelby and Mr. Cassady they 
had adequate financial strength to undertake 
this project, (R. 326) 
Q. And obtain a bond? 
A. And go ahead with the construction 
because the way the sales were — the sale 
were very good. They were exceptionally fine. 
And it was a conclusion of all present that 
the sales program would not lag too far be-
hind \amd it was a calculated thing that we 
could..... 
Q. You took a calculated risk on it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the two Cassadys participated 
in that? 
A. Definitely. (R 326) 
* * * * 
Q. But will you give the substance of 
that conference? 
A. Well, it was as I have stated before, 
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the conclusions were to go ahead. Mr. Ctios-
sady ST. and Jr. felt they were adequately 
financed now to undertake the construction. 
Q. But the bond had not been issued 
yet? 
A. I couldn't say for sure whether the 
bond had been issued then — or I am quite — 
it h a d . . . . (R.327) 
* * * * 
Q. Well, I am going to help you out and 
get the date of the bond and will ask you . . . 
the bond bears date July 21, 1950. Was it 
prior or after that date that this conference 
was held? 
A. It was prior to that date. 
Q. The latter part of May? 
A. Yes. (R. 327) (Italics supplied). 
(Special Note: The rulings of the trial 
court set forth above, on Appellant's objec-
tions were correct. By virtue of Paragraph 6 
of the Bond, Hartford was represented at that 
conference. Cassady represented Hartford). 
Upon cross-examination of the witness, Scott, 
he further elucidated this "calculated risk" thus: 
"Q. And you used the expression "took 
a calculated risk". As a matter of fact every-
body at the meeting took a calculated risk, 
didn't they? 
A. Well in any building project, you 
take a calculated risk going in at any time, 
regardless of what the circumstances are. 
Q. / mean by reason of the fact that 
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they ivere going ahead prematurely, as you 
put it. In other words there weren't any con-
tracts signed yet. There wasn't a bond yet 
but everybody was a little fidgety. They jump-
ed in, and everybody knew they were taking 
a chance? (R. 332) 
A. In analyzing that situation as it 
was, and coming out with a very considered 
conclusion to start construction work, the con-
clusions supporting that act would have had 
to have been substantial enough to convince 
everybody there that the start should have 
been made. 
Q. Well, Mr. Scott, Tm not quarreling 
with the wisdom of the decision. All I am say-
ing that everybody knew they were taking a 
chance. 
A. I don't believe Felt figured they were 
taking \® calculated risk in this respect * * *." 
^ (R. 333) 
* * * * 
Q. In any event, all of the factors that 
went into the decision were brought up for 
consideration and attention at that meeting, 
and discussed? 
A. All the problems that we could anti-
cipate were discussed." (R. 333) (Italics sup-
plied) 
Hartford deliberately executed and delivered 
the bond (Ex PR 1) containing paragraph 6, supra. 
By including this provision in the bond, it opened 
the door to and assumed responsibility for exactly 
the kind of transaction as that which occurred be-
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tween Felt and Cassady with respect to commence-
ment of work on the project. It authorized Cassady, 
as its representative in connection with the bond, 
to alter the terms of the construction contract in any 
manner or degree so long as such alteration did not 
increase the contract cost more than 10%. In this 
connection the testimony of Mr. A. L. Blackburn, 
Hartford's representative in negotiation of the bond 
is interesting. 
"Q. I take it that as a careful bonding 
executive you had familiarized yourself with 
the details of the project that was to be com-
pleted in Utah? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had become familiar generally 
with the contracting parties and the basic 
contract that you were to bond? 
A. I was acquainted only with Cas-
sady." (R. 414, 415) 
The actual construction work on the pro-
ject commenced prior to June 22, 1950 and at that 
time Cassady knew that the channel through which 
the required funds must flow had not been opened, 
and would not be opened until sale of the houses 
to veterans had been consummated, and veterans 
mortgages negotiated, executed and recorded. (Find-
ings 12 and 29) While the contract of July 19, 1950 
(Ex PR 2) and the bond in question (Ex PR 1) had 
not been executed, the terms of the contract had vir-
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tually been agreed upon (R. 329) at the time of 
the May conference concerning which the witness 
Scott, testified at length. The important aspect of 
this situation is that it carried over into the con-
tract of July 19, 1950 after it was actually signed, 
and the bond issued by Hartford. Cassady, by its 
own action had made impossible the regular per-
formance by Felt of the provisions of the contract 
calling for the "course of construction" payments. 
"If the impossibility of performance 
arises directly or even indirectly from the 
acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient excuse 
for non-performance. This is upon the prin-
ciple that he who prevents a thing may not 
avail himself of the non-performance which 
he has occasioned. Non-performance of a 
promise in accordance with its terms is ex-
cused if performance is prevented by the con-
duct of the adverse party." (12 Am. Jur. Con-
tracts, Sec. 381, pg. 958; Bewick v. Mecham, 
28 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 156 Pac (2d) 757; 
Empson Packing Co. v. Claw son, 43 Colo. 188, 
95 Pac 549; Chilton v. Oklahoma Tire and 
Supply Co., 180 Okla. 39, 67 Pac. (2d) 27.) 
Cassady is prevented from asserting that Felt 
violated the "course of construction" provision of 
the contract, because of its own deliberate action in 
commencing work on the project with full knowl-
edge of the result if funds were not available. Hart-
ford through the "open door" provision of the bond 
(Paragraph 6) is bound by Cassady's action and 
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must bear the responsibility for the debacle which 
followed. 
POINT II 
THE DETERMINATION THAT FELT DID NOT 
COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATIONS OF ITS 
CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY MADE IT UNNECES-
SARY FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT 
OF THE "ESCAPE PARAGRAPH" OF THE BOND 
QUOTED BY APPELLANT IN POINTS II AND III 
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
1. The fact that Felt did not violate its con-
tracts with Cassady in any substantial manner de-
prives Hartford of any defense to PrudentiaVs claim 
on the bond. 
Respondent respectfully invites the court's at-
tention to the following quotation from page 63 of 
its original appeal brief: 
"For the purpose of this discussion, let 
it be assumed that Felt was guilty of substan-
tial violations of the Felt-Cassady contract 
of July 19, 1950 (Ex PR 2) in the particulars 
alleged and claimed by Hartford." 
Respondent in its brief then proceeded to discuss 
the question as to whether Felt's breaches of con-
tract were imputable to Prudential under the terms 
of the bond. Respondent submitted its argument on 
the hypothetical basis that if Felt substantially 
breached the contracts with Cassady then such fact 
did not bar PrudentiaVs recovery on the bond. The 
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trial court by its Finding 39 determined that Felt 
"did not breach its contractual obligations to Cas-
sady in any substantial manner". This Finding shut 
off Hartford's principal defense; hence there was no 
fault of Felt to impute to Prudential. In Point I of 
this answer and brief, respondent sincerely believes 
that it has demonstrated that the trial court's Find-
ing 39 is fully sustained by the evidence in this case 
and determines all of the issues in respondent's fa-
vor. There is no necessity for the court considering 
the "escape paragraph" of the bond, nor to enter 
into a discussion as to its consequences. 
2. Even if Felt were guilty of substantial vi-
olations of contracts with Cassady, such violations 
cannot be imputed to Prudential so as to bar its 
recovery on the bond. 
Under Points VI, VIII, and IX of Respondent's 
original appeal brief is fully discussed the inter-
pretation of the "escape paragraph" and the con-
struction and interpretation of the bond which Res-
pondent now reasserts and affirms. It is submitted 
that such discussion answers Appellant's conten-
tions set forth in Point II and Point III of its Peti-
tion for Rehearing and it is unnecessary to repeat 
same. Respondent submits that it had demonstrated 
that even if such substantial violations on Felt's part 
existed that they cannot be imputed to Prudential. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Respondent invites the court's attention to 
some extraordinary conditions in connection with 
the form of the bond. (PR 1) In the first place, the 
bond recognizes the existence of three obligees, Pru-
dential, the LENDER OBLIGEE; Pacific, the 
TITLE OBLIGEE; and Felt, the OWNER OBLI-
GEE. This fact alone must have informed Hartford 
of unusual circumstances in connection with the 
Morningside Heights project. Secondly, the naming 
of another insurance company, Pacific, as TITLE 
OBLIGEE, proclaimed that something had occurred 
involving the priority of the liens of the Prudential 
mortgages. It does not lie with Hartford, in view 
of the form of the bond, to deny that it had knowl-
edge when it executed and delivered the bond that 
claims had already accrued through prematurity of 
commencement of the work. 
2. The court in its opinion correctly deter-
mined that Prudential is entitled to recover on the 
bond the damages Which it has admittedly suffered. 
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
Attorneys for Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association 
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